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A MOST ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO EXCESSIVE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
Lawrence A. Hamermesh*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Although Delaware statutes, as recently amended, prohibit charter
and bylaw provisions that would shift fees to stockholders in litigation
involving the corporation's internal affairs, those statutes leave open
the possibility that charter and bylaw provisions may regulate other
aspects of such stockholder litigation, in addition to choice of forum.
This Article suggests that the enforceability of such provisions should
depend on their tendency to deter or eliminate meritless litigation while
not unduly deterring meritorious litigation. The Article examines a
bylaw under which a stockholder claim would be dismissed if a
committee chosen by the largest stockholders affirmatively supported
such dismissal ("Litigation Review Committee Bylaw"). The Article
evaluates this proposal against the backdrop of previous attempts to limit
stockholder litigation, namely security for expenses statutes, special
litigation committees in derivative suits, the "most adequate plaintiff'
provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") of
1995, and a recently adopted bylaw requiring consent of 3% of the
stockholders in order to initiate a stockholder class or derivative action.
A.

Waves of Concern About ShareholderLitigation

Time after time in the last century, critics of shareholder
litigation-whether brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation or
on behalf of a class of current or former shareholders-have expressed
concern that such litigation might be brought, prosecuted, or settled in a
* Ruby R. Vale Professor of Corporate and Business Law, Widener University Delaware
Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges (and exonerates from any responsibility for error)
the following individuals who supplied very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article:
Frederick Alexander and Verity Winship, as well as Christine Allie and other colleagues at Widener
University Delaware Law School.
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manner contrary to the interests of the corporation or its shareholders, or
both, due to a misalignment of interests between shareholders and the
persons most likely to control and benefit from the litigation-namely,
plaintiffs' lawyers.1 Each time such concerns have reached a climax, one
or more legislative, 2 judicial,3 or private initiatives has emerged as a
cure, 4 or at least a palliative, for the perceived excesses or abuses of
representative shareholder litigation. These initiatives have varied
widely in their approach, degrees of success as a cure, and extent of
adoption by the relevant authorities; and, depending on their approach to
the problem, they have been subjected to varying criticisms of their
efficiency or fairness or both.5
Particularly with regard to class action litigation challenging
mergers and acquisitions, we now find ourselves riding yet another wave
of antagonism to shareholder litigation.6 And, again, we see various
1. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 241, at *9-13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (explaining that because individual plaintiff
shareholders often have little interest in the outcome of class action litigation, the incentive of
plaintiffs' attorneys to accept a quick settlement in order to collect fees is largely unchecked).
2. See, e.g., infra Part ll.A.1 (discussing adoption of New York's "security for expenses"
statute).
3. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the use of special litigation committees as suggested
by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware around
1980).
4. See, e.g., Verity Winship, ShareholderLitigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 50005 (2016) (discussing the use of forum selection clauses in organizational documents).
5. See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, The DeathKnell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 143 (1944) (criticizing New York's security for expenses statute as a
"rich man's law").
6. Courts, lawyers, academics, trade organizations, and others have all expressed such
antagonism. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at
*12 ("In combination, the incentives of the litigants [in shareholder class actions] may be inimical
to the class: the individual plaintiff may have little actual stake in the outcome, her counsel may
rationally believe a quick settlement and modest fee is in his best financial interest, and the
defendants may be happy to 'purchase,' at the bargain price of disclosures of marginal benefit to the
class and payment of the plaintiffs' attorney fees, a broad release from liability."); In re Allied
Healthcare S'holder Litig., No. 652188/2011, 2015 WL 6499467, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23,
2015) ("This practice of compensating class counsel no matter how meaningless the result is,
creates the impression with most objective observers that these actions are brought merely for the
purpose of generating legal fees.... These settlements are all too often entered into because the
corporate officers are faced with the dilemma of protracted costly litigation versus a quick,
relatively cheap settlement that releases the corporate officers and compensates class counsel with
someone else's money (the shareholders)."); ANDREW J. PINCUS, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, THE TRIAL LAWYERS' NEW MERGER TAX: CORPORATE MERGERS AND THE MEGA
MILLION-DOLLAR LITIGATION TOLL ON OUR ECONOMY 1 (2012) (describing merger litigation as

"extortion through litigation, plain and simple"); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn
Settlement in MergerLitigation:An EmpiricalAnalysis and a ProposalforReform, 93 TEx. L. REV.
557, 561 (2015) (contending that "the Delaware courts [should] stop awarding fees for disclosureonly settlements" because evidence suggests that disclosures in such settlements do not affect
shareholder voting).
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proposed cures and palliatives suggested, ranging from fee-shifting to
more aggressive judicial policing of settlements and use of the power to
dismiss complaints.7 Delaware law now limits the range of potential
privately ordered responses, by prohibiting provisions of the certificate
of incorporation or bylaws that would impose liability on a stockholder
for fees and expenses incurred by the corporation or its directors and8
officers in stockholder litigation involving an internal corporate claim.
The sponsors of the legislation establishing that prohibition, however,
noted pointedly that it does not preclude other forms of private ordering,
including charter and bylaw provisions, which might regulate the
conduct of stockholder litigation. 9
That suggestion points to a field for experimentation that is
potentially broad, although fraught with uncertainty.10 Some
commentators question the rationale, embraced by the Delaware courts
but not necessarily controlling in other jurisdictions, that litigationrestricting charter and bylaw provisions are facially valid because they
are part of a "flexible contract" among the stockholders and the
corporation."l Even where that view is accepted, bylaw provisions that
might be facially valid are susceptible to judicial invalidation or nonenforcement on the basis that they are improperly motivated, where
7. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 6, at 585-86, 600-02 (urging rejection of disclosure only
settlements); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of Being
Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litigation, 42 J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (advocating early "triage" of shareholder representative litigation);
Delaware Supreme Court Endorses "Fee-Shifting" Bylaw in Certified Question of Law, WILSON
SONSTNI GOODRICH & ROSATI (May 12, 2014), https://www.wsgr.corn/WSGR/Display.aspx?
SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-fee-shifting.htm ("The practical effect of [the ATP
Tour, Inc.] decision ... is that many boards of directors of private and public Delaware corporations
should seriously consider adopting fee-shifting bylaws of their own.").
8. S.B. 75,148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) (providing that the certificate of
incorporation and the bylaws "may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a
stockholder for the attorneys' fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection
with an internal corporate claim").
9.

DEL. CORP. LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 9 (2015),

http://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSALEXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-UO124513.pdf ("[T]he proposed legislation does not deprive
corporations of the ability to adopt other provisions that address unproductive stockholder litigation
by means other than fee-shifting.").
10. For an exploration of the considerations that might be applied to evaluating the validity of
such provisions, see Winship, supra note 4, at 522, 524-28, 532-36.
11. See, e.g., James D. Cox, CorporateLaw and the Limits of PrivateOrdering,93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 257, 272-78 (2015) (questioning the contractual premise of validity adopted in the
Delaware court decisions); Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater:
DeterringFrivolousStockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims,
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 521 (2015) (noting that a director-adopted bylaw imposing fee-shifting is a
"type of authorization for unilateral modification [that] might raise a Corbin or Williston eyebrow
and is virtually unheard of in any type of contract").
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adopted by unilateral director action, or that they operate inequitably in a
particular case.12 Moreover, like the fee-shifting provisions that some
companies adopted in 2014 in the wake of the Delaware Supreme
Court's opinion in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, an overly
restrictive charter or bylaw provision could elicit another prohibitive
legislative backlash. 13 These considerations suggest that further
development of charter and bylaw provisions that regulate stockholder
litigation should be adopted, if at all, only after careful evaluation of the
likelihood that they would achieve what ought to be their twin goals: (1)
discouraging or eliminating unmeritorious representative litigation at an
early stage of proceedings, before enormous defense costs are incurred,
where that imposes net costs on corporations and their stockholders;
while (2) avoiding the elimination or undue deterrence of meritorious
litigation (namely, litigation with net benefits to corporations and
their stockholders). 14
This Article is an effort to guide such an evaluation, drawing on the
experience of previous responses to perceived abuses of representative
stockholder litigation. It examines another form of litigation-regulating
charter or bylaw provision under which the corporation would establish
a committee of stockholder representatives whose disapproval of
continued prosecution of a claim in a stockholder class or derivative
action involving the corporation's internal affairs results in dismissal of
the claim, such as the Litigation Review Committee Bylaw.' 5 Below,
this Articles below argues that the Litigation Review Committee Bylaw
would be facially permissible under Delaware law; 16 create a layer of
independent, early review of the merits of stockholder litigation;' 7 allow
for experimentation with important elements of the process (such as
establishing the composition, compensation, and investigative powers of
the committee);' 8 and be superior to certain other forms of litigation
regulation, like the use of special litigation committees in derivative
actions and the most adequate plaintiff provision in federal securities
12. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) ("Bylaws
that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if adopted or used for an inequitable
purpose.").
13. Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 11, at 514 ("By the end of 2014, over 50 public
companies, including multibillion dollar companies, adopted either bylaws or charter provisions
requiring a stockholder who is not completely successful in litigation to pay the legal fees of
corporate defendants.").
14. See, e.g., id. at 498.
15. A form of the proposed bylaw appears in the Appendix to this Article. See infra
Appendix.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.C.
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class actions, that have been tried in the past. 19 This Article also
favorably compares the Litigation Review Committee Bylaw to a form
of bylaw, adopted by at least one public company, which would require
stockholders to initiate a class or
approval of at least 3% of the
20
derivative action on their behalf.
This Article should not, however, be interpreted as an unqualified
endorsement of the Litigation Review Committee Bylaw. Such a bylaw
would not necessarily work well in all companies, and its utility would
likely vary depending on the composition of the stockholder body and
the nature of the claims being pursued in stockholder litigation. It is not,
moreover, immune to some of the legitimate concerns that have been
raised with respect to other palliative measures with similar
characteristics. 21 The more modest thesis advanced here, however, is
that a bylaw of this sort is a worthy subject for experimentation.
B.

The LitigationReview Committee Bylaw

The proposed Litigation Review Committee Bylaw would require
that a claim in stockholder litigation arising under a corporation's
internal affairs be dismissed, on motion of the corporation, if a
"Litigation Review Committee" disapproves of the prosecution of the
claim within 120 days after it is first asserted. Unlike the special
litigation committee of directors developed in the context of stockholder
derivative litigation, however, the Litigation Review Committee would
not be appointed by the board of directors or comprised of directors;
rather, its members would be selected by the stockholders having the
largest beneficial interest in the corporation's stock. Thus, the Litigation
Review Committee would resemble the most adequate plaintiff
provision adopted in the PSLRA,22 in that it would rely on the
substantial economic interest of those selecting its members to assure
that internal corporate claims would be rejected or allowed to go forward
based on their economic value to the corporation and its stockholders,
and not based on extraneous considerations like the self-interest of
plaintiffs' counsel or bias on the part of directors.2 3 The Litigation
Review Committee approach, moreover, would differ from the most

19. See infra Part HIB.
20. See infra Part HIB.
21. See, e.g., infra Part III.C. (discussing the shortcomings of the Litigation Review
Committee Bylaw).
22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 27, 109 Stat. 737,
739 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (1995)).
23. See, e.g., infra Part HI.C.
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adequate plaintiff24 approach in federal securities class action litigation,
because it would not require the largest stockholders to take on the
additional role of class plaintiff.
Before evaluating the Litigation Review Committee proposal in
more detail, however, it will be helpful to review its historical context
and precedents.2 5 What we see from that review, as developed below, is
a succession of waves of discontent with shareholder litigation,
expressing remarkably similar themes and arguments but yielding everevolving mechanisms to alleviate that expressed discontent.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

A.

The Stockholder DerivativeSuit

1. The First Wave of Discontent
The stockholder derivative suit, firmly established in American
jurisprudence by no later than 1855,26 has been a perennial source of
controversy. On one hand, it has been hailed as "the most important
procedure the law has yet developed to police the internal affairs of
corporations. 27 Describing derivative suits in a 1942 opinion, Judge
Simon Rifkind stated:
[Derivative suits] have accomplished much in policing the corporate

system especially in protecting corporate ownership as against
corporate management. They have educated corporate directors in the
principles of fiduciary responsibility and undivided loyalty. They have

encouraged faith in the wisdom of full disclosure to stockholders. They
have discouraged membership on boards by persons not truly

interested in the corporation ....
The measure of effectiveness of the
stockholder's derivative suit cannot be taken by a computation of the
money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory effect of such
actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from
stockholders to managements and outsiders. Corporate attorneys now
have an arsenal of authorities to support their cautioning advice to

24. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27.
25. See infra Part I.
26. RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SuITs: BESIEGING THE BOARD
§ 1.03 (2d ed. 2015) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Dodge v. Woolsey, firmly established the
equitable jurisdiction of American courts to entertain shareholders' derivative actions.").
27. Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 77 (1967)
(quoting Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom andfor What Ends Is CorporateManagementResponsible?,
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 47-48 (Edward S.Mason ed., 1959)).
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clients who may be disposed to risk28evasion of the high standard the
courts have imposed upon directors.
For every such encomium to the derivative suit, however, one can
find several equally vehement condemnations. Perhaps because of the
increasing frequency of derivative litigation, such condemnations
seemed to reach a peak by the 1940s. 29 In 1936, no less a figure than
Dean Roscoe Pound opined: "There is no need to recite the difficulties
involved in stockholders' suits for mismanagement. These suits have
been abused quite as much as the powers of directors they have intended
to restrain. 3° Writing in the Michigan Law Review in 1937, practitioner
Harris Berlack observed that "whatever differences may exist, one
common characteristic is undeniably present wherever and whenever
such an action 3is
instituted: the stockholders' suit is universally reviled
1
and deplored.",
Why? According to one commentator at the time, the "present
evils" of the derivative suit included the fact that because of the need for
risky contingent fee representation, the role of plaintiffs counsel was
usually left to "to the younger and less experienced or to the less
32
successful and sometimes less scrupulous members of the profession.
The same observer therefore concluded, "[p]laintiffs, as a consequence,
find it difficult to obtain proper representation; and defendants must
oppose tactics that are not always the most ethical or, at the least,
are subjected to an attack that is unnecessarily and unpleasantly
belligerent., 33 Others were less charitable: in a 1943 essay in the
Columbia Law Review, it was asserted that stockholder derivative suits
are "often an instrument of more or less genteel blackmail"; 34 a reply to
28. Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
29. In a provocative analysis, Lawrence Mitchell suggests that the antagonism exhibited by
the corporate bar to stockholder derivative litigation reflected anti-Semitism, rooted in the fact that
stockholder plaintiffs' lawyers tended to be Jewish. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Gentleman's
Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation, 36 QUEEN'S L.J. 71
100-01 (2010).
30. Roscoe Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdictionover Corporationsin Equity, 49 HARV. L. REV.
369, 395 (1936) (suggesting, as an alternative to private derivative litigation, use of judicial
visitatorial power over for-profit corporations, as well as charitable corporations, as a check on
mismanagement). Dean Pound's suggestion never achieved traction.
31. Harris Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 MICH. L. REv. 597, 599,
612 (1937) (proposing establishment of"a government official or agency specially charged with the
duty of prosecuting actions to protect the rights of stockholder"). Mr. Berlack's proposal was never
implemented.
32. Id. at 603.
33. Id.
34.

Harold D. Lasswell, Proposal, A Non-BureaucraticAlternative to Minority Stockholders'

Suits, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 1036, 1036 (1943) (recommending a non-profit information bureau to
promote shareholder monitoring of management).
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that essay put up no resistance on that point, explaining that derivative
suits "in their present virulent form... are a by-product of the
fees awarded by courts to the successful
depression and of the high
35
practitioners in this field."
These negative perceptions undoubtedly fueled the animosity
toward derivative litigation advanced in the influential 1944 report on
the subject prepared by a committee of the New York Chamber of
Commerce chaired by Francis Wood ("Wood Report"). 36 Lacking
nothing in enthusiasm, that report concluded plaintiffs' attorneys in
derivative litigation made "the ambulance chaser by comparison a
paragon of propriety., 37 According to the Wood Report, "the chief
opportunity for profit in this field is fimding a 'situation' where the
management or directorate can be mulcted on some technical, arbitrary,
or vicarious rule of absolute liability, regardless of their honesty,
fairness, or good judgment., 38 The report concluded, "derivative actions
have come to harbor as a matter of course solicitation and inducement in
bringing them, champerty and maintenance in their prosecution, the
in their trial, and division of fees with laymen at
brokerage of litigation
39
their conclusion.,

The Wood Report launched more than verbal criticism. It also
recommended and led to the adoption of New York's "security for
expenses" statute. 40 That statute requires the plaintiffs in derivative

35.

Arthur H. Dean, Reply, .4Non-BureaucraticAlternative to Minority Stockholders' Suits,

43 COLUM. L. REV. 1040, 1041 (1943).
36. FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE
SUITS (1944).

37. Id. at 47.
38. Id. at 36.
39. Id.at 48.
40. 1944 N.Y. LAWS 1455, signed April 9, 1944, adopting what now appears as N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003). That statute provides:
In any [shareholders' derivative action], unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs hold five percent
or more of any class of the outstanding shares or hold voting trust certificates or a
beneficial interest in shares representing five percent or more of any class of such shares,
or the shares, voting trust certificates and beneficial interest of such plaintiff or plaintiffs
have a fair value in excess of fifty thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right such
action is brought shall be entitled at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment
to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action and by the
other parties defendant in connection therewith for which the corporation may become
liable under this chapter, under any contract or otherwise under law, to which the
corporation shall have recourse in such amount as the court having jurisdiction of such
action shall determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of such security
may thereafter from time to time be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court
having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that the security provided has or may
become inadequate or excessive.
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litigation to post a bond to assure that an award of defense expenses
would be funded. On the other hand, it also provides two important
exceptions to that requirement: first, the court retains the discretion to
determine the amount of the bond and the amount of any recourse to the
bond; and second, the bond requirement does not apply at all if the
plaintiffs in a particular case own 5% or more of the corporation's stock
or shares worth over $50,000.41
It is important for present purposes to note what the statute does not
do. First, it does not explicitly define or alter the standards for
determining when a court should order that the required security be
applied to pay defense costs. 42 Second, it does not require that a
derivative suit be approved or supported by any threshold level of share
ownership; if the bond required by the court is posted, the suit can go
forward, regardless of merit and regardless
of the number or value of
43
suit.
the
support
holders
whose
shares
Id.; see also Dykstra, supranote 27, at 88-89 (identifying states that adopted security for expenses
statutes following New York's lead).
41. The $50,000 was of course a far more substantial investment in 1944, when the statute
was enacted, than it is today. Adjusted for inflation the statute would require a holding of $685,875
in 2016 to avoid the bond requirement. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
42. See, e.g., Donner Mgmt. Co. v. Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 541-42 (Ct. App. 2006)
(stating California's security for expenses statute "does not define the circumstances under which
the defendant may obtain attorney fees on a bond or other security furnished by the plaintiff').
Judicial interpretation of such statutes has inconsistently read such standards into the statutes. The
U.S. Supreme Court stated that an award of defense costs is mandatory under New Jersey's security
for expenses statute if the plaintiff "fails to make good his complaint," whatever that means. Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1949) ("[The] general effect [of the statute]
is to make a plaintiff having so small an interest liable for all expenses and attorney's fees of the
defense if he fails to make good his complaint .. ").Likewise, in construing the California statute,
Donner held that "a defendant may enforce a security posted under section 800 if he or she is
determined to be the prevailing party." 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541. In contrast, however, Alphin v.
Cotter, No. 9804-2573, 1998 WL 1297098, at *5 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. June 18, 1999), interpreting
Pennsylvania's security for expenses statute, 15 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1782(c) (2001), held: "This
court does not believe defendants have a mandatory right to collect attorneys' fees from plaintiff
under the relevant statutes. Rather, it is clearly a matter of the court's discretion to grant or deny
such compensation... " In so ruling, the court noted the absence of evidence "to support a
conclusion that plaintiffs litigation of this issue involved dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct,"
suggesting that the award of fees out of posted security is subject to the same standards applicable to
fee-shifting generally. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) ("[A] federal court may award
counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons."' (quoting 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77(2) (2d ed. 1972))).
43. It is not inconceivable, however, that the court's perception of the merits of a particular
derivative suit might affect its exercise of discretion in setting the amount of the required security.
Thus, the court could use a preliminary assessment of the merits to determine whether to set security
at a level high enough that would likely force the plaintiff to abandon the litigation or low enough
that the plaintiff would be likely to continue to pursue the case. See Goldstein v. Weisman, 185 F.
Supp. 242, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (requiring plaintiff to post security of $5,000 on nominal defendant
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If the statute is intended to discourage commencement of meritless
litigation without discouraging meritorious litigation, its rationale is
necessarily twofold: the first premise must be that a person owning less
than 5% or $50,000 of the corporation's stock will be deterred from
commencing or continuing to pursue a meritless derivative suit because
of the prospect of having to pay a fee award; and the second premise is
that a stockholder or group of stockholders owning more than 5% or
$50,000 have an investment in the corporation sufficient to assure that
their decision to bring a derivative suit will be motivated by, and thus
likely to serve, the interests of the corporation and not the private
interests of themselves or their lawyers. 4
The first premise is at least uncertain, given the uncertainty as to
whether the statute makes a fee award any more likely than under the
prevailing bad faith exception to the American rule. 45 A sanction only
rarely or lightly imposed is unlikely to deter undesired litigation activity
to any material extent. The second premise is also uncertain46
constitutionally sufficient as a basis for discrimination, to be sure, but
there is nothing in the statute that assures that a holder or a group of
holders with sufficient shares to avoid the bond requirement will have
resources or motivations adequate to ensure an informed, deliberate, and
disinterested assessment of the merits of the litigation.4 7 If only because
of collective action problems, it seems eminently possible that
disaggregated stockholders will underinvest in efforts to evaluate and
then support meritorious litigation; and, it seems equally possible that
stockholders with enough shares to avoid the bond requirement but,
without the inclination to invest in evaluating derivative claims, could
choose to support litigation that lacks merit. In sum, what the New York
security for expenses statute lacks is any assurance that the persons
(other than plaintiff's counsel) whose decisions determine whether a

corporation's motion to set security at $75,000); Neuwirth v. Namm-Loeser's, Inc., 161 F. Supp.
828, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (requiring plaintiff to post a $1,000 bond, stating that "[ilf, as and when
[the nominal corporate] defendant can demonstrate to the Court why its position in this action
should not be neutral and that the amount of security so fixed has become inadequate it may apply
to have the same increased").
44. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 552 ("We do not think the state is forbidden to use the amount of
one's financial interest, which measures his individual injury from the misconduct to be redressed,
as some measure of the good faith and responsibility of one who seeks at his own election to act as
custodian of the interests of all stockholders, and as an indication that he volunteers for the large
burdens of the litigation from a real sense of grievance and is not putting forward a claim to
capitalize personally on its harassment value.").
45. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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bond is required will expend any resources to evaluate the quality of the
derivative claims to be pursued.4 8
2. The Second Wave of Discontent
Whatever its virtues, the adoption of New York's security for
expenses statute led one influential commentator to describe it at the
time as "the death knell for stockholders' derivative suits in New
York.",4 9 Suffice it to say, however, that this prediction of the impact of
the statute did not prove correct. 50 Derivative suits apparently became
considerably more, not less, frequent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 5'
and by the late 1970s, they were once again generating considerable
consternation.52 Although the data, at the time, suggested that the
increased frequency of such suits was by no means disproportionate in
relation to the growth of litigation against corporations generally, 53 some
48. The California security for expenses statute at least requires the court to inquire into the
merits of the litigation before requiring that a bond be posted: it requires the defendant seeking to
require that posting to demonstrate "(1) [t]hat there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution
of the cause of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party will benefit the corporation
or its shareholders"; or, "(2) [t]hat the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not participate
in the transaction complained of in any capacity." CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c)(l)-(2) (West 2014).
This threshold inquiry into the merits, however, does not address the possibility that stockholders
owning sufficient shares to avoid the bond requirement altogether might support a derivative suit
due to inappropriate motives or without adequate investigation.
49. Homstein, supra note 5, at 123.
50. See, e.g., Dykstra, supra note 27, at 90 (describing "judicial restraint" in avoiding
"oppressive[]" application of security for expenses statutes); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E.
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative
Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 261-62 (1981) (noting reports of the death of the derivative suit
"proved exaggerated,.. . as plaintiffs discovered various tactics by which to outflank these
statutes").
51. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 50, at 261-62, 262 n.5.
52. A 1978 article referred to "exponential growth of third-party and shareholder suits."
Edward Paul Mattar III, Indemnification and Liability Insurancefor CorporateBoard of Directors
and Trustees-A Legal Guide for Directors, 83 COM. L.J. 550, 550 (1978). A 1979 article in
Business Week asserted that "the number of claims against corporate directors has jumped 300% in
the past five years." End of Directors'Rubber Stamp, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 10, 1979, at 72. In 1977, in
connection with the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), a derivative suit on behalf
of Greyhound Corporation, Justice Lewis Powell wrote privately to Justice Thurgood Marshall
about his perception of the derivative suit:
While a single shareholder has standing to maintain a derivative shareholder suit, there
are lawyers who make a plush living using tame clients who acquire one share of stock
in numerous corporations for the purpose of setting the stage for 'strike' suits. The
objective usually is to force a settlement and claim a generous fee to be paid by court
order often from corporate funds.
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Thurgood Marshall (May 31, 1977), http://
supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion~pdfs/1976/75-1812.pdf. Professor Verity Winship
deserves the credit for bringing this letter to my attention.
53. Thomas M. Jones, An EmpiricalExamination of the Incidence of ShareholderDerivative
and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. REv. 306, 307 (1980) ("[I]ncreases in
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were expressing concern that shareholder litigation would discourage
strong
qualified directors from serving as such, at
54 least without
indemnification and liability insurance policies.
It is thus not surprising, at least in hindsight, that the next round of
attacks on derivative suits emerged around 1980. This round of attacks,
however, came not from legislative action, but from opinions from two
supreme courts: the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The first of these two opinions
generated experience of particular relevance to the proposal in this
Article and will be explored first.
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, state law
permitting, "the disinterested directors of an investment company may
terminate a stockholders' derivative suit brought against other directors
under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts of
1940." 55 Defendants in derivative suits redoubled efforts to take up the
suggestion that a special litigation committee of disinterested,
56
independent directors could effectively resolve to dismiss such suits.
Through a series of state court opinions, which those efforts generated, it
became widely accepted that such a committee could effectively
determine that a derivative suit should not be continued, and that a court
could accept that determination and dismiss the litigation at the instance
of the committee and the corporation.57 In 1990, that special litigation
procedure was incorporated into the Model Business Corporation Act. 58
shareholder litigation make up only a small portion of the apparent increase in the number of suits
being brought against corporations today.").
54. Id. (inferring that corporate executives may either decline to serve on the boards of other
firms or serve only with assurances that indemnification or liability insurance policies are adequate
to protect them from financial losses); see also Mattar, supra note 52, at 550, 556; Alan R. Sloate,
Outside CorporateDirectors: Will IncreasingLiability Send Them Running Out of Board Rooms?,
N.Y. ST. B.J. 618, 619-21 (1976).
55. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 473 (1979).
56. Marc I. Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder
Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1980) (indicating that Burks v. Lasker, which
involved claims under the Investment Company Act, was the impetus for use of the special
litigation committee).
57. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Anderson,
615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1979).
58. Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes to the Model Business Corporation ActAmendments Pertainingto Derivative Proceedings, 45 Bus. LAw. 1241, 1246-47 (1990) (adding
section 7.44(a) and (b)(2) of the Model Business Corporation Act, requiring dismissal of a
derivative proceeding on motion of the corporation if a committee of qualified directors "has
determined in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are
based, that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the
corporation").
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As with the New York security for expenses statute, commentators
on the special litigation committee fallout from Burks v. Lasker quickly
concluded that the death knell of the derivative suit was sounding
again. 59 Yet, as with the security for expenses statutes, the special
litigation committee proved not up to the task of slaying the putative
derivative suit dragon. The history of the Delaware courts' treatment of
the use of the special litigation committee process demonstrates why it
failed to live up to its initial reputation as a threat to the viability of
derivative litigation. The first Delaware case to apply the analytical
rubric supplied in the Delaware Supreme Court's 1981 Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado decision made it abundantly clear (and with deft irony) that
a special committee's decision could not support dismissal unless it was
based on an extensive investigation and report.6 ° Second, subsequent
efforts to use special litigation committees to dismiss derivative
litigation foundered on an inability to convince the courts that the
committee members were sufficiently disinterested and independent.61
Third, invoking the decision of a special litigation committee as a basis
for dismissing a derivative suit inevitably triggered at least some
59. George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate ShareholderLitigations: The
Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96, 98 (1981) ("[A] rule permitting the board to
terminate derivative suits which, by hypothesis, it refuses to bring itself could mean the death of the
derivative suit."); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV.
387, 391-92 (2008) (summarizing contemporaneous concerns about the impact of special litigation
committees on derivative litigation).
60. 430 A.2d at 788-89; Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 510-11 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("[A] report
by a Special Litigation Committee recommending dismissal of a derivative suit must be at least 150
pages in length, exclusive of appendices and attachments .... In this case the Special Litigation
Committee represents that it has interviewed more than 140 persons at various locations throughout
the world during the course of its investigation .... The law firm retained by the Special Litigation
Committee to assist it in its investigation is said to have expended more than 2,000 hours on the
matter so far (this is plaintiff's figure-the Committee says the hours are 5,000 in number) and has
received fees and reimbursements in the vicinity of $500,000 for its efforts. The report itself is 156
pages in length, exclusive of attachments."); see Sutherland v. Sutherland, 958 A.2d 235, 236-37
(Del. Ch. 2008) ("[T]he special litigation committee has not satisfied the court that it acted in good
faith and conducted a reasonable investigation.").
61. London v. Tyrrell, No. 3321-CC, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2010)
(denying special litigation committee motion to dismiss "because there are material questions of fact
regarding (1) the [special litigation committee]'s independence, (2) the good faith of its
investigation, and (3) whether the grounds upon which it recommended dismissal of this lawsuit are
reasonable"); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939-40 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("Special
litigation committees are permitted as a last chance for a corporation to control a derivative claim in
circumstances when a majority of its directors cannot impartially consider a demand .... In
evaluating the independence of a special litigation committee, this court must take into account the
extraordinary importance and difficulty of such a committee's responsibility."); Lewis v. Fuqua,
502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985) ("A defendant who desires to avail itself of this unique power to
self destruct a suit brought against it ought to make certain that the Special Litigation Committee is
truly independent. If a single member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's
wife, be above reproach.").
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discovery-perhaps not plenary discovery, but discovery that was
significant and substantive. 62 Finally, the proponents of the special
litigation committee dismissal determination were unable to prevail if
there were any issue of material fact in their proof of the
disinterestedness, 63independence, and reasonable investigation on the part
of the committee.
Although there have been instances in which the special
committee's judgment has led to dismissal,64 one treatise explains the
shortcomings of the special committee process as a tool to police
shareholder derivative litigation:
[U]se of a special litigation committee is a highly problematic solution
for corporations confronted by derivative litigation. It is a virtual
certainty that every facet of the endeavor, from the independence of its
membership (and the attorneys and other experts it employs) to the
thoroughness of their investigation, analysis, and report, will be
vigorously challenged by the derivative plaintiff and closely
scrutinized by the courts, and the acceptance of a committee's
recommendation is at best uncertain. To have any reasonable chance of
passing judicial muster, the work of the committee will inevitably be
time-consuming and costly. Employment of a special litigation
committee cannot be looked upon as a facile or perfunctory way of
disposing of derivative litigation. 65
It is important to note why the courts have subjected the special
litigation process to scrutiny so searching that it has become a rarely
used device. First, from the outset, the courts have expressed concern
that the process could deprive a stockholder of the otherwise available
legal right to commence litigation to vindicate the rights of the
itf
66
corporation. When itfirst approved of the concept of dismissal upon
62. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 510-11 ("[E]xperience shows (as it did here) that the plaintiff will
attempt to seek all the discovery that he could possibly hope to obtain if he were seeking discovery
on the merits of the allegations of the complaint.").
63. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787-89; In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 920;
Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 519.
64. Kindt v. Lund, No. 17751-NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 62, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2003)
(dismissing suit based on special litigation committee report and declining to proceed to
discretionary second-step business judgment review); Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 520. It has been
suggested that dismissals of derivative litigation at the instance of special litigation committees are
underreported in judicial opinions, and that during the period from 1993 to 2006 there were fiftyeight instances of such dismissals. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special
Litigation Committees: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1320 (2009).
65. DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., 2-42 DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 42.04
(2015).
66. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786-87; see also Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 509. ("[I]t must be kept in
mind that the entire procedure is designed to provide a means, if warranted, to throw a derivative
plaintiff out of Court before he has an opportunity to engage in any discovery whatever in support

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss1/10

14

Hamermesh: A Most Adequate Response to Excessive Shareholder Litigation

2016]

A MOSTADEQUATE RESPONSE

action of a special litigation committee, the Delaware Supreme Court
observed that "[i]f... corporations can consistently wrest bona fide
derivative actions away from well-meaning derivative plaintiffs through
the use of the committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much,
if not all, of its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate
means of policing boards of directors. 67 Second, the courts recognized
that those doing the "wresting" away from the derivative plaintiffnamely, the members of the special litigation committee-are
susceptible to bias, if only because of their typical association as
directors with those charged in the litigation with wrongdoing.68 As
expressed in Zapata, "[t]he question naturally arises whether a 'there but
for the grace of God go I' empathy might not play a role. ' 69 Therefore,
"[t]he further question arises whether inquiry as to independence, good
faith and reasonable investigation is a sufficient safeguard against abuse,
perhaps subconscious abuse.",70 The relatively strict judicial scrutiny of
special litigation committee recommendations to dismiss derivative
litigation has thus been intended as an antidote to bias attributable to the
fact that the decision-makers (committee members) are typically
nominated by, and serve as, directors with the very individuals being
sued in the71derivative litigation they are called upon to decide whether
to dismiss.
All that said, the shortcomings of the special litigation committee
process are not the only reason for the infrequency of its use. 72 In
fairness, the impact of that process may have been blunted or, perhaps
more accurately, preempted, by a 1984 opinion by the other major
supreme court referred to earlier: namely, the Delaware Supreme Court
and its opinion in Aronson v. Lewis. 73 That opinion made the pre-suit
demand requirement a much more formidable basis for dismissing
derivative suits, using a procedure that (unlike the special committee
process) required no discovery effort or investigative expense.74 After
of the merits of his cause of action purportedly brought on the corporation's behalf.").
67. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786.
68. Id. at 787.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 940 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("In

evaluating the independence of a special litigation committee, this court must take into account the
extraordinary importance and difficulty of such a committee's responsibility. It is, I daresay, easier
to say no to a friend, relative, colleague, or boss who seeks assent for an act (e.g., a transaction) that
has not yet occurred than it would be to cause a corporation to sue that person.").
72. See Myers, supra note 64, at 1316-17 (finding a total of 106 special litigation committees
formed between 1993 and 2006).
73. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
74. Several commentators have remarked on Aronson's dramatic reconstruction and revival of
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Aronson, the only derivative suits that survived dismissal-and were
thus suitable for application of the special litigation process-were cases
in which the court had determined (or the parties expected that it would
determine) that the claims had merit, making it even more difficult for a
special litigation committee to conclude that the case should be
dismissed as contrary to the interests of the corporation. 5 Thus, the very
efficacy of the post-Aronson Delaware Court of Chancery rule 23.1
motion to dismiss may go a long way to explain why it has eclipsed the
special litigation committee process as a means of policing
unmeritorious shareholder derivative litigation.76
Still, the experience of the special litigation committee process in
relation to derivative litigation may guide evaluation of contemporary
proposals to limit shareholder litigation, including the Litigation Review
Committee Bylaw proposal put forward in this Article.77 What that
experience teaches is that if the pertinent decision-makers are
presumptively suspected of bias or lack of objectivity, such that the
persons relying on their judgment must, beyond any issue of material
fact, prove their independence and the reasonableness of their decision,
all after substantial discovery, a process relying on such decision-makers
is likely to be ineffective and at best only infrequently used.78
B. FederalSecurities Class Actions
Private class actions for damages under the federal securities laws
(particularly under U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
Rule 1Ob-5) 79 are a much newer phenomenon than shareholder
derivative litigation: they can trace their origin only as far back as the
1940s, when Rule 1Ob-5 was adopted and the courts first recognized a
private cause of action under that rule. 80 Despite its relative youth,
however, class action litigation based on Rule lOb-5 has been at least as
vilified as derivative suits. In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court declared it
''presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from

the pre-suit demand requirement. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Accidental Elegance ofAronson v.
Lewis, in THE ICONIC CASES INCORPORATE LAW 167 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008); Davis, supra
note 59, at 399-400; Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 7, at 36-37.
75. See Davis, supra note 59, at 439-41.
76. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808.
77.

See infra Part III.A-C.

78. Steinberg, supra note 56, at 25-28.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
80. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implying a private
cause of action for damages under Rule lOb-5); Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures,22
Bus. LAW. 891, 921-23 (1967) (describing the adoption of Rule 10b-5).
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Inspired by the
that which accompanies litigation in general.'
"Contract With America" in 1994, legislation was introduced in
Congress to mandate a loser-pays rule specifically targeting federal
securities class actions. 82 Although that rule was never adopted,
Congress did enact the PSLRA.83 Echoing the 1944 Wood Report on
derivative suits, the report accompanying the PSLRA harshly criticized
securities class actions and, inter alia, concluded:
[T]oday certain lawyers file frivolous 'strike' suits alleging violations
of the Federal securities laws in the hope that defendants will quickly
settle to avoid the expense of litigation. These suits, which
unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital and chill corporate
disclosure, are often based on nothing more than a company's
announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud. All too often,
the same 84'professional' plaintiffs appear as name plaintiffs in suit
after suit.

One of the key solutions embraced by the PSLRA was to bring the
"certain lawyers" to heel, through the presumptive mandate that the
court appoint as lead plaintiff the "most adequate plaintiff," namely the
plaintiff having the largest financial interest in a recovery. 85 That lead
plaintiff would in turn select lead counsel, "thereby increasing the role of
institutional investors in securities class actions" with a view "to
transfer[ring] primary control of private securities litigation from
lawyers to investors. 8 6
In the two decades that have ensued since the adoption of the most
adequate plaintiff provision, there has been considerable debate about
whether the provision has benefited investors or the public generally, as
anticipated by its sponsors. From the outset, there has been a concern
that large institutional investors would not step forward to fulfill their
intended role as sponsors and monitors of class action litigation. 87 In
81. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
82. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, LoserPays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 322 (1998)
(describing the fee-shifting proposal as "draconian" because "it would have applied in unclear but
potentially explosive ways to plaintiff class actions").
83. Stephen J. Choi et al., Do InstitutionsMatter? The Impact of the Lead PlaintiffProvision
of the PrivateSecuritiesLitigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 873 (2005).
84. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995); WOOD, supra note 36, at 45-48.
85. In what surely must be regarded as a coup for law professors, this proposal stemmed
directly from a then recent law review article suggesting this approach. See Elliott J. Weiss & John
S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency
Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2105-06 (1995).
86. S.REP. No. 104-98, at 6.
87. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARiz. L. REv.
533, 540 (1997) (questioning whether the most adequate plaintiff provision would meaningfully
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fact, the greatest increase in institutional investor involvement as class
plaintiffs has been on the part of public pension funds, rather than larger
institutional investors generally. 88 On the other hand, there is evidence
that increased participation by institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions has correlated positively with larger recoveries. 89
This correlation has been attributed to "cherry-picking," 90 but,
notwithstanding the pejorative connotation of the term cherry-picking,
selectivity in bringing securities class actions that generate the greatest
recoveries may well be at least one of the beneficial results intended by
the most adequate plaintiff provision of the PSLRA. 91
As advanced most notably by David Webber, however, there are
reasons to be concerned that the PSLRA's most adequate plaintiff
approach fails to achieve the legislative goal of improving litigation
quality by prioritizing the size of the plaintiff's financial stake in any
recovery. 92 The absolute size of that interest does not necessarily assure
motivation or ability to assess the merits of proposed litigation: a large
institutional investor for whom even a large potential recovery is a
"rounding error" may devote much less effort in assessing and
monitoring securities litigation than an individual whose loss, though
smaller in absolute terms, represents a significant portion of her net
worth. 93 Nor should it be inflexibly assumed that individual investors
alter control of securities class action litigation, and whether economic interest in a potential
recovery is a useful measure for choosing a lead plaintiff).
88. Choi et al., supra note 83, at 889 (noting "evidence strongly supports" the hypothesis that
"public pension funds became more active as lead plaintiffs after the enactment of the PSLRA").
89. Id. at 900 (reporting "evidence that public pension fund participation is correlated with a
greater likelihood of a High-Value Outcome from litigation").
90. Id. at 900-01 (noting evidence that "public pension funds are simply cherry-picking by
participating in cases in which characteristics observable prior to the filing of suit indicate the case
is likely to result in a large settlement").
91. Selectivity that focuses only on the size of a potential settlement, however, may not result
in prosecution of cases in which liability is most deserved; it may simply take advantage of large
potential damages to extract a settlement regardless of the likelihood of liability. That untoward
possibility, of course, presupposes that defendants' willingness to settle is unrelated to their
perceptions of the likelihood of liability, and dependent only on the scope of potential damages. Id.
at 901-03.
92. David H. Webber, The Plightof the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106
Nw. U. L. REv. 157, 168 (2012).
93. Id. at 173-74 ("[F]or institutional investors, most stock frauds are rounding errors. For
individuals, they can be life-altering experiences."). On the other hand, Webber has also suggested
that involvement of public pension funds (particularly if underfunded) in securities class action
litigation may stem in part from the presence of individual board members who have suffered losses
as individual securities holders or sellers. David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play" Driving Public
Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2031,
2080-81 (2010) ("Such funds may be pursuing lead plaintiff appointments because the beneficiary
board members personally incur losses in securities frauds, and thereby are more highly motivated
to take the lead in a class action to remedy the loss.").
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lack the sophistication attributed to institutional investors. 94 Moreover,
an institutional investor with a large loss but with a large continuing
equity interest in the company may have a substantial interest in
95
minimizing the adverse impact of litigation on the issuer.
Finally, institutional investors may have an interest in using securities
litigation to secure long-term governance reforms instead of litigationspecific recoveries. 9 6
Like the security for expenses statutes in derivative litigation, then,
the PSLRA's most adequate plaintiff rule depends on what is at best a
rough correlation between (1) the plaintiffs financial stake in the
litigation and (2) the likelihood that the litigation will be initiated and
rather than for private benefits of the plaintiff
prosecuted on its merits,
97
counsel.
s
or plaintiff
C. Mergers and Acquisitions Class Action Deal Litigation
In a path-breaking 2004 article,98 Professors Thompson and
Thomas identified class actions challenging mergers and acquisitions on
the basis of state law of fiduciary duties as a new wave of shareholder
litigation, succeeding derivative suits and class actions based on federal
securities law. 99 Thompson and Thomas were optimistic that this new
94. Webber, supra note 92, at 180 (urging openness to appointing individual investors as colead plaintiffs with institutional investors, and noting that "some concentrated individual investors
are sophisticated; basic economic and psychological principles suggest they are likely to be highly
motivated").
95. Id. at 196 ("Even after a fraud is revealed, institutional investors often hold some stake in
the defendant company.").
96. Id. at 202-03 ("Current and future shareholders likely benefit[] from [governance]
reforms, but selling shareholders d[o] not .... [T]he tradeoff between compensation and corporate
governance reform raises concerns about another threshold purpose of securities class action:
deterrence of fraud.").
97. In contrast, securities class action litigation in Canada relies on a threshold judicial
inquiry into the merits. See Louis-Martin O'Neill et al., Secondary Market Liability. Supreme Court
of Canada Clarifies the Screening Mechanismfor Class Actions, DAVIES (Apr. 21, 2015), https://
reaction.dwpv.com/rs/vm.ashx?ct=24F76F1AD2E30AEDC 1Dl 80A9D 12E9010DCBE7BB3D3871
4DD4CF371647BF8D90DDD78035 (describing the opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court in
TheratechnologiesInc. v. 121851 Canada Inc., [2015] 2 S.C.R. 106 (Can.), applying article 225.4
of the Quebec Securities Act, which requires that the Canadian courts preliminarily determine
whether "'there is a reasonable possibility that it will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff,"' and
holding that "the gatekeeping role of the courts under article 225.4 requires that the [Canadian]
courts 'undertake a reasoned consideration of the evidence to ensure that the action has some
merit"' (quoting Securities Act, R.S.Q., c. V-I.1, § 225.4 (Can.))).
98. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-OrientedClass Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004).
99. Id. at 135 ("[A] new form of shareholder litigation has emerged that is distinct from
derivative or securities fraud claims: class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director
conduct in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this article show that these
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wave of shareholder litigation would be superior to their predecessor
forms of shareholder litigation as a tool of managerial accountability:
they expressed the view that "acquisition-oriented class actions
substantially reduce management agency costs,100while the litigation
agency costs they create do not appear excessive."
In the decade that followed this sanguine assessment, however, a
much more negative view of acquisition-oriented class actions came to
predominate. The Delaware courts themselves sounded alarms about the
state of stockholder representative litigation.l1' Much of the blame for
the perceived abuses of acquisition-oriented shareholder class actions
was placed upon the increased incidence of so-called multi-forum
litigation, in which multiple shareholder class representatives would
initiate duplicative fiduciary duty litigation in multiple jurisdictions.102
Dictum in a 2010 opinion of the Delaware Court of Chancery suggested
a possible solution to this particular problem: a provision in the
corporation's certificate of incorporation requiring that litigation relating
to the corporation's internal affairs be conducted exclusively in a single
forum, namely the courts of the state of incorporation.0 3 The court
recognized in the opinion, however, "[t]he issues implicated by an
exclusive forum 10selection
provision must await resolution in an
4
case."
appropriate
The world only had to wait three years for that "appropriate case."
In his influential 2013 opinion in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement
Fund v. Chevron Corp.,105 the Chancellor plowed some very important
ground. First, his opinion established (albeit theoretically subject to
reversal by the Delaware Supreme Court) that a bylaw establishing an
exclusive forum for litigating internal affairs claims is at least facially
valid; 10 6 second, the opinion acknowledged that enforceability in a
acquisition-oriented suits are now the dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber
derivative suits by a wide margin.").
100. Id. at 140.
101. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959-60 (Del. Ch. 2010)
("Once a pattern for settlement is established,... [t]he resulting system involves little real litigation
activity, generates questionable benefits for class members, provides transaction-wide releases for
defendants, and offers a good living for the traditional plaintiffs' bar."). See supra notes 5-6, for
criticisms of stockholder representative litigation.
102. See Theodore N. Mirvis, Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and
Suggests Some Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17.

103. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 960 ("[l]f boards of directors and
stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus
for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an
exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.").
104.
105.
106.

Id. at961 n.8.
73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Id. at 939 ("[F]orum selection bylaws are not facially invalid as a matter of statutory
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specific case might be a different matter, 10 7 and that improperly
motivated adoption or inequitable or unreasonable application of such a
bylaw could result in non-enforcement; 10 8 finally, and perhaps most
importantly for purposes of this Article, the court articulated a
potentially sweeping rationale for finding the bylaw facially valid. 109
The court explained:
[B]ylaws, together with the certificate of incorporation and the broader
[Delaware General Corporation Law], form part of a flexible contract
between corporations and stockholders, in the sense that the certificate
of incorporation may authorize the board to amend the bylaws'
terms and that stockholders who invest in such corporations assent
to be bound by board-adopted bylaws when they buy stock in
those corporations. 110
Although that flexible contract does not, as the court explained, extend
to "external" claims such as "a tort claim against the company based on
a personal injury [the plaintiff] suffered that occurred on the company's
premises or a contract claim based on a commercial contract with the
corporation," ' it would apparently extend to any provision of the
charter or bylaws regulating matters of internal corporate affairs,
including litigation of claims within that space. 112 It does not take much
imagination to see that this rationale for the exclusive forum bylaw at
least theoretically supports a wide variety of other provisions regulating
stockholder litigation.113
III.

THE CONTEXT AND CONTENT OF THE LITIGATION REVIEW
COMMITTEE BYLAW

A. Recent Responses
In evaluating the Litigation Review Committee Bylaw suggested in
this Article, it is useful first to consider briefly two other approaches to
law.").
107. Id.at 949.
108. Id. at 958 (holding that plaintiff can argue that "the forum selection clause should not be
respected because its application would be unreasonable," or that "the bylaw was being used for
improper purposes inconsistent with the directors' fiduciary duties").
109. Id. at 949-50.
110. Id. at 940.
111. Id. at 952, 957.
112. Id. at951-52.
113. For a thoughtful inventory and critique of such possible provisions, see Winship, supra
note 4, at 531-32. As Professor Winship notes, charter and bylaw provisions could conceivably
prescribe limitations on discovery, time for bringing suit, and damages. Id. Other applications could
include establishing pleading requirements and burdens of proof.
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limiting stockholder litigation that rest on the flexible contract theory
articulated in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund and ATP Tour,
Inc. 14 The first approach is the one evaluated in ATP Tour, Inc. itself:
a bylaw requiring the stockholder plaintiff to pay the fees and expenses
of the defendants if the plaintiff "does not obtain a judgment on the
merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full
remedy sought." 115 Supporters and critics of this bylaw agreed on one
thing: the bylaw would significantly deter litigation. 116 What they
disagreed about, however, was whether the bylaw would deter
meritorious as well as frivolous litigation." 7 That disagreement has yet
to be tested empirically: the Delaware General Assembly reined in that
experimentation in 2015, adopting legislation declaring that fee-shifting
118
provisions in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws are invalid.
As noted earlier, however, that legislation conspicuously left open the
possibility that other charter or bylaw provisions regulating stockholder
litigation might be valid. 9
B. The ImperialHoldings Bylaw
The second flexible contract approach to limiting stockholder
litigation would exploit that possibility but has received far less attention
than fee-shifting provisions. In 2014, Imperial Holdings, Inc. ("Imperial
Holdings"), a Florida corporation, adopted a bylaw that requires the
written approval of the holders of at least 3% of the outstanding shares
as a condition to a stockholder bringing a "representative claim"
114. See infra Part.ILI.A-B.
115. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014).
116. Id. at 560 ("Fee-shifting provisions, by their nature, deter litigation. Because fee-shifting
provisions are not per se invalid, an intent to deter litigation would not necessarily render the bylaw
unenforceable in equity."); Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 11, at 495 (finding fee-shifting
bylaw "is likely to eliminate all stockholder litigation, irrespective of merit"); Liz Hoffman,
Delaware to Weigh Who Pays Legal Fees in CorporateLitigation, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/06/10/delaware-to-weigh-who-pays-legal-fees-in-corporate-litigation
(noting a letter from the Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform describing fee-shifting
provisions as "a new tool authorized by the Delaware courts[,] ... which businesses could use to
reduce the amount of unnecessary litigation that accompanies corporate mergers").
117. Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 11, at 495 ("The inability of fee-shifting bylaws
to differentiate between meritorious and frivolous suits while impairing fundamental stockholder
rights is a fundamental flaw with the entire concept.").
118. Whether fee-shifting charter and bylaw provisions are found to be effective and develop
in states other than Delaware remains to be seen. For a mandatory, public ordering approach, not
involving charter or bylaw provisions, see 18 OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 1126(C) (2014) (noting in
stockholder derivative actions the court "shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the
prevailing party or parties the reasonable expenses including attorneys' fees, taxable as costs,
incurred as a result of such action").
119. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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(defined to include class action claims of breach of fiduciary by the
directors). 120 The rationale for this bylaw was similar to the most
adequate plaintiff provision of the federal securities laws; namely, that a
suit on behalf of stockholders ought to enjoy a reasonably substantial
level of support from the stockholders to be benefited by the prosecution
of the litigation, so that such litigation would be controlled, in effect,
by persons having a significant economic interest in the outcome of
the litigation. 121
Reflection suggests a number of limitations, however, on the utility
of the Imperial Holdings bylaw. First, read literally, it would preclude
the filing of suit until after delivery of the requisite percentage of
stockholder consents. 122 Thus, a stockholder owning less than 3% of the
stock would need to solicit and obtain sufficient consents of other
stockholders before filing suit. 23 Given the time that solicitation could
entail,1 24 it takes little imagination to see the potential for impairment of
120. Section 3.16 of the Imperial Holdings bylaws provides:
Except where a private right of action at a lower threshold than that required by this
bylaw is expressly authorized by applicable statute, a current or prior shareholder or
group of shareholders (collectively, a "Claiming Shareholder") may not initiate a claim
in a court of law on behalf of (1) the corporation and/or (2) any class of current and/or
prior shareholders against the corporation and/or against any director and/or officer of
the corporation in his or her official capacity, unless the Claiming Shareholder, no later
than the date the claim is asserted, delivers to the Secretary written consents by
beneficial shareholders owning at least 3% of the outstanding shares of the corporation
as of (i) the date the claim was discovered (or should have been discovered) by the
Claiming Shareholder or (ii), if on behalf of a class consisting only of prior shareholders,
the last date on which a shareholder must have held shares to be included in the class.
Imperial Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 23, 2014).
121. See Allison Frankel, Shareholder Challengers Minimum-Stake-to-Sue Bylaw, REUTERS
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-franel/2015/01/21/shareholder-challenges-overminimum-stake-to-sue-bylaw (noting that the bylaw "was intended to stop shareholders without a
real financial interest in the outcome of their own case from hijacking deals and forcing the
company to defend meritless litigation"). Delaware's public benefit corporation statute takes a
similar approach, prescribing a 2% or $2 million ownership threshold for bringing a derivative suit
to enforce the directors' statutory obligation to balance the pecuniary interests of stockholders with
the interests of others "materially affected by the corporation's conduct." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 365, 367 (2016).
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123. The 3% consent requirement is not likely to be an insuperable barrier. When the SEC
adopted its subsequently vacated proxy access rule in 2010, it found, based on data on stock
ownership in public companies, "reaching the 3% ownership threshold we are adopting is possible
for a significant number of shareholders either individually or by a number of shareholders
aggregating their holdings in order to satisfy the ownership requirement." Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations No. 179, 75 Fed. Reg. 56692. It would likely be easier to meet a 3% consent
requirement as specified in the Imperial Holdings bylaws, which, unlike SEC Rule 14a-1 1, does not
impose a holding period requirement. Id. at 56690 n.221.
124. Unless consents were solicited and received from ten or fewer stockholders, it is likely
that a plaintiff stockholder seeking the approval required by the Imperial Holdings bylaw would
need to comply with the SEC's proxy rules. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1-5.
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meritorious claims: delaying commencement of litigation in order to
solicit consents to satisfy the bylaw's 3% support requirement could
effectively preclude expedited relief in cases in which such relief is
important and valuable (to cure significant disclosure failures, for
the operation of unduly burdensome deal
example, 125 or to 1 enjoin
26
devices).
protection
Of course, a court asked to enforce the Imperial Holdings bylaw in
such a situation could well choose not to apply it literally and decline to
dismiss or stay the case summarily on the theory (as recognized in ATP
Tour, Inc.) that the bylaw would apply inequitably or unreasonably in
such circumstances. 127 Or, as with the security for expenses statutes
governing derivative actions,1 28 the court could allow the case to proceed
and defer enforcement of the bylaw in order to afford the stockholder
plaintiff an opportunity to gather the required consents. 129 Indeed, this
sort of case-by-case determination of whether to enforce a bylaw as
written is a common judicial approach to questions of bylaw validity in
which the courts decline to declare a bylaw generally or facially invalid
but do not shrink from exercising judgment as to whether to enforce a
bylaw in a particular situation. 130 However, if a case-by-case threshold,
In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 425-27 (Del. Ch. 2002)
125. See, e.g.,
(enjoining an exchange offer by controlling stockholder due to failure to provide investment banker
valuation analysis).
126. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 18485 (Del. 1986) (enjoining "lock up" asset option and break-up fee provision).
127. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) (noting that
despite facial validity, whether a "fee-shifting bylaw is enforceable ... depends on the manner in
which it was adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked"); see also Boilermakers
Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 943-58 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("[1]f a plaintiff believes
that a forum selection clause cannot be equitably enforced in a particular situation, the plaintiff may
sue in her preferred forum and respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue by
arguing that, under Bremen [v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)], the forum selection
clause should not be respected because its application would be unreasonable.").
128. See, e.g., Baker v. MacFadden Publ'ns, Inc., 90 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1950) (finding a court
may vacate an order of security for expenses based on joinder of shareholders owning sufficient
shares to meet the 5% or $50,000 threshold for exemption from the security requirement); Dykstra,
supra note 27, at 93 ("It is now accepted practice to give a plaintiff time after he has filed his
complaint to ascertain whether other shareholders will join.").
129. A similar approach has been taken in stockholder derivative litigation when a named
plaintiff loses standing (by selling his stock, for example) to continue to prosecute the case; in such
a situation, the courts have allowed the litigation to continue by affording a plaintiff's counsel an
opportunity to identify another stockholder to intervene as plaintiff and continue the litigation. See,
e.g., In re Extreme Networks, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 573 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing named plaintiff who sold his shares, but noting that "another qualified
shareholder can intervene on the grounds that their rights are no longer represented"); In re
MAXXAM, Inc., 698 A.2d 949, 956 (Del. Ch. 1996).
130. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, DirectorNominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117,148 (2014)
("[lit is surely far easier for a court to find a case-specific equitable reason for declining to enforce a
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judicial determination regarding the merits of the suit is going to be
made before enforcing (or not enforcing) the bylaw, so such a bylaw
may add little to the courts' already existing power to control which
cases go forward and when expedited discovery proceedings are
appropriate. 131 One suspects that if the Delaware Court of Chancery
found that a stockholder complaint presented compellingly meritorious
claims, it would either decline to enforce the bylaw based on equitable
considerations, or would 1look
for (and likely find) a way to interpret the
32
dismissal.
avoid
to
bylaw
The foregoing review of the Imperial Holdings bylaw only
addresses possible concerns about "false negatives" (application of the
bylaw to preclude meritorious claims) and how the courts might avoid
such preclusion on a case-by-case basis. There is also potential,
however, for "false positives" (i.e., failure to weed out unmeritorious
claims). The Imperial Holdings bylaw would permit any 3% stockholder
or group of stockholders to enable prosecution of a representative claim,
regardless of the merits of the case, their level of knowledge of relevant
facts or their competence to evaluate those merits, and any personal
conflicting motivation for approving the litigation. 13 3 Thus, and like the
security for expenses statutes and the most adequate plaintiff provision
of the PSLRA, the Imperial Holdings bylaw is a relatively blunt
instrument that would only, at best, indirectly fulfill the twin objectives
of eliminating unmeritorious litigation without unduly discouraging
134
litigation that serves the interest of stockholders and the corporation.

bylaw limitation rather than to make a generally applicable pronouncement about the formal validity
of such a limitation."); see also Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 598 (Del. Ch. 2015) (declining
to apply a fee-shifting bylaw to a plaintiff who was no longer a stockholder at the time the bylaw
was adopted).
131. Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 7, at 5 (finding Delaware's "system resolves
shareholder litigation by encouraging the early presentation of relevant facts pleaded in the
complaint, and by either dismissing the complaint if those facts fail to demonstrate legal merit, or
identifying how the complaint is meritorious, in a fashion that encourages the protagonists to
settle").
132. See Hamermesh, supra note 130, at 148 ("[T]he courts have given effect to concerns
about the negative effects of advance notice provisions by construing such provisions narrowly, to
avoid impairment of the shareholders' right to nominate directors."). On the other hand, depending
on the circumstances, the court might well conclude that an inability to gamer support from 3% of
the stockholders indicates that the complaint lacks compelling merit.
133. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c)(1) (West 2014) (requiring inquiry into the merits of
litigation). The Imperial Holdings bylaw does not require such inquiry. See supranote 120.
134. See Frankel, supra note 121 ("[The] bylaw was intended to stop shareholders without a
real financial interest in the outcome of their own case from hijacking deals and forcing the
company to defend meritless litigation.").
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C. Evaluation of the LitigationReview Committee Bylaw

The proposed Litigation Review Committee Bylaw is, quite
obviously, modeled on the special litigation committee procedure
described above. 135 Like that procedure, the proposed bylaw would
create an opportunity to evaluate and, if deemed appropriate, terminate
the prosecution of claims in stockholder litigation; no advance consent
13 6 Most
or approval to commence such litigation would be required.
importantly, the Litigation Review Committee would be required, in
order to cause the dismissal of claims in stockholder litigation, to make
an affirmative, case-specific determination about the merits of allowing
the continuing prosecution of the claims.1 37 Unlike the security for
expenses statutes in derivative suits, and the most adequate plaintiff
approach of the PSLRA, the evaluation of claims through the Litigation
Review Committee process would not depend solely on a rough
correlation between the plaintiffs' share ownership and their motivation
and ability to control the litigation, although the generally positive

motivation would play a role through the designation of committee
138
members by the largest stockholders of the corporation.
The Litigation Review Committee Bylaw is more comprehensive
than the special litigation committee procedure, in that it applies to
stockholder class actions as well as derivative suits, but its reach would
still be limited to litigation involving the corporation's internal affairs
and, thus, within the scope of the flexible contract identified in
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund and A TP Tour, Inc. 139 And, by
135. See supra Part II.A.2.
136. Compare Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782-84 (Del. 1981) (discussing
directors' "managerial decision making power, which encompasses decisions whether to initiate, or
refrain from entering, litigation"), and Steinberg, supra note 56, at 4-6, 16, with infra Appendix
("No stockholder may continue to prosecute an internal corporate claim ... derivatively on behalf
of the corporation or on behalf of a class of stockholders of the corporation, if ... the prosecution of
that claim is disapproved by or on behalf of the Litigation Review Committee.").
137. The bylaw's prohibition of committee action by unanimous written consent is intended to
promote case-by-case engagement and to avoid rote review by committee members. See infra
Appendix (referring to subsection (f) of the author's proposed bylaw).
138. Compare N.Y. Bus. CoRP. L. § 627 (McKinney 2003) (requiring that plaintiffs hold at
least 5% of the corporation's shares), and Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 85, at 2059-60, 2105
(discussing plaintiffs' and their attorneys' ability and incentive to control the litigation), with infra
Appendix (omitting minimum share requirements for initiating litigation).
139. Dismissal at the instance of a Litigation Review Committee thus would not, like a special
litigation committee determination in derivative litigation, depend on the power of a committee of
the board of directors to manage a corporate asset in the form of a claim by the corporation. Rather,
it would depend upon the application of the bylaw as a contract binding the stockholder to consent
to dismissal, if the committee determines that the stockholder's claim should be dismissed. As a
result, the Litigation Review Committee could act on class action claims as well as claims in
derivative suits. But see infra note 141 (discussing a limitation on the power of the Litigation
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reaching both such forms of litigation, it more fully addresses the field in
which litigation agency costs are most likely to arise (i.e., where the
litigation is most at risk of serving the interest of plaintiffs' counsel
instead of a stockholder client or stockholders generally). 140
The Litigation Review Committee Bylaw has several other
advantages; moreover, over the special litigation committee, its
predecessor process in derivative suits. 141 First, through its
implementation in the form of a bylaw, it achieves a degree of
legitimacy, in terms of stockholder consent, by virtue of the fact that
stockholders could, if they wished, unilaterally eliminate the
procedure.142 Second, the proposed method for constituting the
committee-in which the members are selected by the largest
stockholders of the company-would largely avoid the "structural bias"
concerns that have led the courts to demand strong proof of
independence and reasonable investigation before accepting a special
143
litigation committee's recommendation that litigation be dismissed.
Review Committee relative to a special litigation committee of directors).
140. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 85, at 2064.
141. Before noting such advantages, it is important to recognize that the authority of a
Litigation Review Committee as proposed here is considerably narrower than that of the traditional
director-comprised special litigation committee. For example, a board special litigation committee is
typically endowed with the power to prosecute or settle claims on behalf of the corporation. See,
e.g., Myers, supra note 64, at 1313 ("After its investigation, the [special litigation committee]
decides whether to pursue the claims, settle them, or seek their dismissal."). It is at best doubtful, in
contrast, that a Litigation Review Committee, not being comprised of directors, would be given
such authority over claims by or against the corporation.
142. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 943, 955-56 (Del. Ch.
2013) ("[T]he statutory regime provides protections for the stockholders, through the indefeasible
right of the stockholders to adopt and amend bylaws themselves."). That right, of course, may be
limited by provisions requiring approval by a supermajority stockholder vote, or by the presence of
a majority stockholder opposed to elimination of the bylaw. But, that right is often practically
available and meaningful, and, where that is the case, a court should be more willing to give effect
to the bylaw than in a case, like the special litigation committee procedure, in which the
stockholders have no say in the matter at all other than before the court.
143. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (b) of the author's proposed bylaw). A desire
to eliminate concern about such bias is what prompts the inclusion of a provision in the bylaw
precluding removal of the committee members except by stockholder vote. See infra Appendix
(referring to subsection (c) of the author's proposed bylaw). That concern also appears to underlie
the provision in the Model Business Corporation Act, adopted in 1990, authorizing appointment of a
special litigation panel by the court, rather than by the board of directors. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 7.44(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1991) ("[U]pon motion by the corporation [the court may appoint a panel
of one or more individuals] to make a determination whether the maintenance of the derivative
proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation."). Professor Gevurtz made a similar proposal
in 1985, suggesting judicial appointment of provisional directors to determine the disposition of
derivative litigation. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a
Better Method for Determining the CorporateInterest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 265,
324-25 (1985) (proposing to, in lieu of permitting courts to appoint a special litigation committee,
"have the courts automatically appoint a panel of provisional litigation directors in every derivative

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 10

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:147

To the contrary, the selection of committee members by the largest
stockholders should encourage a much more deferential form of judicial
review. Hence, the proposed bylaw would require that judicial review be
limited by applying a standard similar to the standard applicable to
judicial review of arbitral awards in which the decision is subject to
judicial countermand only based on affirmative evidence of misconduct
by the tribunal. 144 While the bylaw does not attempt to define the nature
of the misconduct that might lead a court to reject a committee decision
to discontinue prosecution of one or more claims in stockholder
litigation, the analogy to review of arbitral awards ought to suggest that
such misconduct must materially compromise the integrity of the
decision.1 45 Through this approach to judicial review, the Litigation
Review Committee Bylaw would avoid much of the cost of the special
litigation committee process and would be much more likely to be
effective and, therefore, employed.
The proposed Litigation Review Committee Bylaw is also flexible
in a variety of important respects. The first such respect involves timing:
as proposed here, the bylaw would require the Litigation Review
Committee to recommend dismissal of a claim in stockholder litigation

suit. These court-appointed directors would be charged with making all litigation decisions for the
corporation as the real plaintiff in the action"). The Litigation Review Committee Bylaw, in contrast
to these approaches, does not require judicial involvement in selection of the members. See George
W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WiSC. L.
REV. 881, 907 (proposing that proxy solicitation by public corporations be managed by a committee
of the ten to twenty largest stockholders).
144. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (stating an arbitral award may be vacated "(1) where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made"). It has been
suggested that because contracting parties can effectively forgo ordinary appellate review by
agreeing to arbitration, they can achieve the lesser included result forgoing or limiting appellate
review in litigation-by contract. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making ProceduralRules
Through PartyChoice, 90 TEX.L. REV. 1329, 1351 (2012).
145. See, e.g., Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006) ("When parties
agree to arbitrate their disputes they opt out of the court system, and when one of them challenges
the resulting arbitration award he perforce does so not on the ground that the arbitrators made a
mistake but that they violated the agreement to arbitrate, as by corruption, evident partiality,
exceeding their powers, etc.-conduct to which the parties did not consent when they included an
arbitration clause in their contract. That is why in the typical arbitration, which unlike the one in this
case is concerned with interpreting a contract, the issue for the court is not whether the contract
interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether the arbitrators had failed to interpret the
contract at all, for only then were they exceeding the authority granted to them by the contract's
arbitration clause." (citations omitted)).
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within 120 days after its assertion. 146 Of course, a committee could act
more quickly if it concluded that a more prompt determination were
necessary to avoid undue cost to the corporation and its stockholders. It
is certainly open to debate, on the other hand, whether that time
limitation is too short, but there is legislative support for the proposition
that even complex cases can and should be evaluated and resolved
within 120 days, subject only to a narrow scope of judicial review, if the
relevant tribunal is disinterested and reasonably sophisticated in matters
of the sort. 14 7 And, allowing a significantly longer period exacerbates
the possibility that a plaintiff could reasonably invest significant time
and energy in prosecuting a case only to learn thereafter that the
committee has resolved to reject continued prosecution of the claims
being pursued. 148
There is also room for flexibility in defining the composition of the
Litigation Review Committee. As proposed here, the members would be
selected by the three largest stockholders, who would be identified based
on beneficial ownership reports as filed with the SEC. 149 Like the most
adequate plaintiff provision of the PSLRA, however, this approach could
be criticized because it fails to account for the possibility of "empty
ownership" resulting from a person's holding of financial instruments
(puts, for example) that effectively reduce the person's net economic
interest in the stock. 150 The framework of the proposed bylaw would of
course permit a more refined approach to determining the level of
146. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (b) of the author's proposed bylaw).
147. The Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act contemplates that "an arbitrator shall issue a final
award within the time fixed by an agreement or, if not so fixed, within 120 days of the arbitrator's
acceptance of the arbitrator's appointment," unless extended (by no more than 60 days) by the

parties' agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5808(b) (2016).
148. That possibility exists, of course, even with the proposed 120-day deadline, especially
where litigation necessarily addresses an expedited transaction. In that circumstance, however, the
plaintiff (and plaintiff's counsel) and the defendants share an interest in a prompt determination by
the committee.
149. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (b) of the author's proposed bylaw). The
number of members could vary, of course, although the experience with special litigation
committees suggests that the Litigation Review Committee should be comprised of more than one
member. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Inv'rs, 729 F.2d 372, 379-380 (6th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting dismissal based on determination by a one-person special litigation committee);
Sutherland v. Sutherland, 958 A.2d 235, 243-44 (Del. Ch. 2008) (rejecting one-person litigation
committee recommendation of dismissal); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985) ("If a
single member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be above
reproach."); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (Mass. 1990) (finding the fact that the special
litigation committee was comprised of just one director is "a factor to be weighed in deciding
whether the committee was independent and unbiased").
150. See Webber, supra note 92, at 183 ("[O]mission of derivatives from the largest financial
interest calculation may lead to the appointment of lead plaintiff applicants who do not actually
have the largest financial interest in the litigation.").
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ownership that would identify the stockholders entitled to select the
members of the committee.
Another area of flexibility and room for experimentation is the
matter of the informational rights of the Litigation Review Committee.
The bylaw proposed here is silent on that matter out of a preference for
case-by-case determinations of how the committee should be informed,
and should inform itself, of relevant facts and law. 151 Not all cases would
require the same level of inquiry. And, while it might be useful to be
more prescriptive of committee rights to information, 152 it does not seem
unreasonable to expect that corporate directors and officers interested in
supporting a committee determination to discontinue claims in
stockholder litigation would also have an interest in responding fully
and fairly to a committee request for information (or would fairly
expect a refusal to reject litigation claims if management were
uncooperative in supplying requested information). 153 Likewise, to
the extent that committee members share or are guided by their
designating stockholders' economic interest in the corporation, they
can be expected to make optimal choices about the level of cost and
effort to devote to gathering information. 154 For all of these reasons
it would seem imprudent to constrain the committee members'
information gathering discretion through provisions in the Litigation
Review Committee Bylaw.
Perhaps, the most troublesome uncertainty about the efficacy of the
proposed Litigation Review Committee Bylaw is whether the largest
stockholders would participate cooperatively in fulfilling their
responsibilities under the bylaw to select the members of the
151. See infra Appendix.
152. The director members of a special litigation committee, unlike the non-director members
of the Litigation Review Committee, enjoy a statutory right of access to corporate information. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (2016) ("Any director shall have the right to examine the
corporation's stock ledger, a list of its stockholders and its other books and records for a purpose
reasonably related to the director's position as a director.").
153. One possible reason for reticence, however, could be a legitimate desire to preserve an
attorney-client privilege attaching to communications that might be relevant to the committee's
deliberations. If only because of uncertainty and novelty about the nature of the relationship
between the corporation and members of a Litigation Review Committee, the corporation may be
reluctant to risk waiving the privilege by sharing attorney-client communications with the
committee members. Even if the corporation and the committee members could conceivably invoke
privilege by relying on a "common interest," the scope of what constitutes a "common interest" is
unclear and, it appears, may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., 3Com Corp. v.
Diamond II Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN 2010 LEXIS 126, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010)
("Delaware... employs a broader rule [than Massachusetts] when determining whether a
communication was, or has remained, confidential for privilege purposes.").
154. See, e.g., Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 85, at 2095-97 (describing the relationship
between economic interests and effective monitoring of class litigation).
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committee. 155 An isolated refusal or failure to select a member can be
dealt with by inviting the next largest stockholder to make the
selection.15 6 More problematic would be more widespread. nonacceptance of the invitation to designate a committee member. Several
provisions of the proposed bylaw are designed to overcome such
reticence. First, it is explicit that the largest stockholders would not be
required to designate one of their own principals, officers, or agents as a
committee member; rather, they could choose any person they deem
157
adequately qualified to perform the functions of a committee member.
This aspect of the bylaw avoids the concern, most pronounced in the
PSLRA's most adequate plaintiff provision, that an institutional investor
or other large stockholder would be reluctant to take on the full
responsibility of acting as a plaintiff in litigation. 158 Second, the
proposed bylaw contemplates a treatment of committee members that is
designed to encourage service, or at least minimize the burdens of
service, as a committee member. 159 Thus, the bylaw would authorize the
corporation or the designating stockholder or both to compensate
committee members for their service in that capacity, 160 leaving the
details and terms of such compensation to ad hoc negotiation and
experimentation. 161 In addition, the bylaw would afford committee
members the most protective rights of indemnification and advancement
of expenses 162that the corporation provides to any of its directors
and officers.

155. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (b)(i) and (ii) of the author's proposed bylaw).
156. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (b)(ii) of the author's proposed bylaw).
157. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (b)(ii) of the author's proposed bylaw). Thus,
a stockholder might select an experienced lawyer to serve on a Litigation Review Committee. And,
of course, a Litigation Review Committee, once constituted, could retain a law firm to assist in
evaluating claims in stockholder litigation. That retention could be ad hoc, or could be on a
continuing basis addressing multiple successive lawsuits.
158. See supranote 87 and accompanying text.
159. See infra Appendix (referring to subsections (c), (d), and (e) of the author's proposed
bylaw).
160. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (d) of the author's proposed bylaw).
161. Except in cases where the stockholder litigation targets the designating stockholder as a
defendant, there should ordinarily be no concern about whether compensation to be paid by that
stockholder inappropriately incentivizes the committee member. To the contrary, such
compensation should enhance the perception that the member's conduct on the committee is
motivated by the interests of stockholders generally. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., How
Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 649, 666-71
(2016) (describing the development of and response to activists' arrangements-referred to as
"golden leashes"-to provide incentive compensation for their director nominees).
162. See infra Appendix (referring to subsection (e) of the author's proposed bylaw). It maybe
advisable to implement such indemnification and advancement undertakings by express contract,
since it is at least doubtful that a member of the Litigation Review Committee would be considered
a "director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation" and thus within the coverage of the
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The Litigation Review Committee Bylaw, as proposed here, is
silent on the question of the role of the stockholders who select the
members of the committee. 163 As with directors chosen to represent a
particular stockholder on the board of directors, it might reasonably be
expected that a member of the Litigation Review Committee would
share information with her designating stockholder about an evaluation
of a pending stockholder claim. 164 A designating stockholder might also
prefer direct input into the work of the Litigation Review Committee, in
which case an institutional stockholder might choose to appoint one of
its own officers or employees. On the other hand, a designating
stockholder might prefer to keep a greater distance from the evaluation
of stockholder litigation claims and, in particular, from any non-public
165
material information that might emerge from such an evaluation.
Accordingly, the proposed Litigation Review Committee Bylaw avoids
any specification concerning the role of the designating stockholders or
litigation-related information may or should be
the extent to which
66
shared with them.'
Apart from the uncertainty about the likely level of stockholder
willingness to participate in the selection of Litigation Review
Committee members, the proposed bylaw inevitably presents significant
cost issues. Like special litigation committees in derivative actions, a
Litigation Review Committee of the sort proposed here would, in any
particular case, have to devote non-trivial resources to investigating a
claim in order to determine whether to require its dismissal. 167 The costs
of doing so, which have contributed to the infrequency of use of special
litigation committees in derivative litigation, would surely also

corporate indemnification statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2016). The same consideration
would probably apply with respect to provision of insurance coverage for service as a member of
the committee (that is, it may be advisable to provide for such insurance through express contract
rather than assume that an existing director and officer liability insurance policy would apply to
committee members).
163. See infra Appendix.
164. See J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder
Directors,70 Bus. LAw. 33, 54-57 (2014) ("Delaware law has developed a rule that accommodates
information sharing."). The possibility of such information sharing, on the other hand, may
exacerbate the uncertainty noted above as to whether sharing with the committee information
otherwise subject to attorney-client privilege might waive that privilege. See supra note 153 and
accompanying text.
165. Id. at 54 ("When counsel work predominantly with public companies and are steeped in
concerns about Regulation FD and insider trading, the intuitive response is strongly against any type
of information sharing .... ").
166. See infra Appendix.
167. See Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 58, at 1244 (providing an example of how a
board of directors must utilize resources in order to respond to a demand).
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discourage use of the Litigation Review Committee proposed here.
Other techniques for addressing stockholder litigation (such as early
settlements or motions to dismiss) may well be preferred. But, in some
cases a Litigation Review Committee, like a special litigation committee
in a derivative suit, may be the most cost-effective means of evaluating
whether specific claims are beneficial to the corporation and its
stockholders or should be dismissed as contrary to their interests. 168 In
short, the Litigation Review Committee Bylaw may be a means to
establish, and have available, a process that could effectively be used in
cases in which other options are less attractive.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of judicial opinions validating charter and bylaw
provisions that regulate the conduct of stockholder class and derivative
litigation, 169 and Delaware legislation that prohibits such provisions that
impose fee-shifting but that otherwise leaves open the possibility of
other litigation-regulating provisions, 17 it is predictable that further
experimentation with such provisions will occur. When it does, the
validity and utility of such provisions should be judged by their ability to
eliminate or discourage litigation that provides no net benefit to
stockholders, while at the same time avoiding deterrence or elimination
of beneficial litigation.
The problem of counterproductive stockholder litigation is not new,
17
1
and it has been addressed repeatedly in the last seventy-five years.
Previous approaches to separating "good" cases from "bad" cases have
either failed or achieved questionable success. 172 As means to screen
litigation, security for expenses statutes in derivative litigation and the
most adequate plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA have depended on a
correlation between share ownership and sufficient motivation to
monitor and control litigation efficiently-a correlation that may be
statistically supportable, but that does not in any way assure thoughtful
evaluation in any particular case. 7 3 In contrast, the special litigation
committee procedure in derivative litigation, while it certainly adopts a
case-specific focus, suffers from substantial judicial skepticism due to

168. See Steinberg, supranote 56, at 5-7 (providing examples of the role that special litigation
committees play in derivative lawsuits).
169. See supra Part I.C.
170. See supra Part HI.A.
171. See supra Part II.
172. See supra Part II.
173. See supra Part ll.B.
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the possibility of structural bias, and as a result has become
a costly and
174
relatively rarely used approach to controlling litigation.
The Litigation Review Committee Bylaw proposed in this Article
exploits the evolving authority for litigation-regulating bylaws and
attempts to take advantage of the virtues and avoid the shortcomings of
earlier approaches to limiting stockholder litigation. 175 By empowering a
committee selected by the company's largest stockholders to require
dismissal of claims in stockholder class and derivative litigation, the
Litigation Review Committee Bylaw draws on the best elements of (1)
the security for expenses statutes and the most adequate plaintiff
provisions of the PSLRA-in particular, their reliance on a correlation
between share ownership and optimal litigation choices-and (2) the
special litigation committee, with its case-specific review of the merits
of litigation involving the corporation's internal affairs. Possible lack of
interest on the part of large stockholders in selecting committee
members, and the costs of the work of a Litigation Review Committee,
may make the proposed bylaw relatively unattractive as a preferred
means for addressing stockholder class and derivative action. But, it may
be a useful option in certain situations and may commend itself as an
experiment in using authority to regulate internal affairs litigation
through bylaw provisions.

174. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part HI.C.
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APPENDIX

THE LITIGATION REVIEW COMMITTEE BYLAW
Article [X], Section [A]
(a) No stockholder may continue to prosecute an internal corporate
claim, as defined in Section 115 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, derivatively on behalf of the corporation or on behalf of a class of
stockholders of the corporation, if, within 120 days after such claim is
first asserted in a complaint or other pleading, the prosecution of that
claim is disapproved by or on behalf of the Litigation Review
Committee. If the Litigation Review Committee timely disapproves of
the prosecution of the claim, the stockholder shall be deemed to have
consented to the dismissal of the claim on motion of the corporation,
unless (i) the disapproval was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means, (ii) there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of any of
the members of the Litigation Review Committee, or (iii) the members
were guilty of misconduct in connection with their disapproval.
(b) The Litigation Review Committee shall be comprised of [three]
individuals elected in accordance with the following procedure:
(i) Within 10 days after each annual meeting of stockholders, the
Secretary of the corporation shall identify the [three] persons, other
than any affiliate or associate of the corporation or any of its
directors, holding the beneficial interest in the largest number of
shares of the corporation's common stock as most recently reported
on beneficial ownership reports filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;
(ii) Within two days after doing so, the Secretary shall request
that each such stockholder select an individual (who may but need
not be affiliated with such stockholder) to serve as a member of the
Litigation Review Committee for a term of one year or until his or
her successor is elected and qualified;
(iii) Within 10 days after such request, each such stockholder
shall advise the Secretary of the name and address (including email
address) of the individual selected to serve;
(iv) Upon receipt of such names by the Secretary, the individuals
selected shall be deemed to be constituted as the Litigation
Review Committee;
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(v) If a stockholder identified in accordance with subparagraph
(i) declines to select an individual to serve as a member of the
Litigation Review Committee, the Secretary may request that the
holder of the next largest number of the corporation's shares select
such an individual.
(c) Members of the Litigation Review Committee may not be
removed as such except by a vote of stockholders.
(d) Members of the Litigation Review Committee may be
compensated for their services as members of the committee by the
corporation or the stockholder who selected them, or both.
(e) For proceedings arising out of their actions or inactions as
members, the corporation shall agree that members of the Litigation
Review Committee shall have the most extensive rights to
indemnification and advancement of fees and expenses arising from
their service as members of the committee that are provided for any of
the directors and officers of the corporation.
(f) For purposes of quorum and voting requirements, meetings, and
notice of meetings, the Litigation Review Committee shall be considered
to be a committee of the board of directors, except that the Litigation
Review Committee may not act by unanimous written consent to
disapprove the prosecution of an internal corporate claim.
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